NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Transformation General Stéphane Abrial has responded to your questions and policy recommendations! In the second installment of his answers, the general discusses maritime strategy and global governance, cultural obstacles to integration, and the role of strategic communications in NATO operations.

Thank you to everyone who participated in this Q&A with General Stéphane Abrial, NATO's Supreme Allied Commander Transformation.

In the first installment, we presented answers from General Abrial that specifically concern NATO's new "Smart Defense" initiative. In this second part, we present the general's responses to a variety of other issues including cultural obstacles to integration, naval strategy, and the importance of strategic communications.

You can read more about Allied Command Transformation, Smart Defense, and General Abrial's career in the original article.

Dries Belet, Trainee with the European External Action Service, Belgium: What sort of future-oriented naval program and capabilities is NATO developing to meet challenges of maritime security in the twenty-first century? What strategy and force structure does NATO envisage to deal with piracy, secure trade routes and and energy supplies, ensure freedom of navigation in the global maritime commons, and contribute to promoting a rules-based order on the high seas?

General Abrial: First, I would like to clarify that there are very few NATO-owned capabilities. Most of them are provided by member nations. In particular, many of them maintain robust naval capabilities that serve in NATO operations, as demonstrated during Operation Unified Protector in Libya and in our ongoing operations off the Horn of Africa.

One answer to your first question is the implementation in the near future of the project Triton, the NATO Future Maritime Information Services. It will look at current maritime command and control information system capabilities and will examine which capabilities are still required for the future, which are obsolete and which ones need to be enhanced. The scope is to deliver enhanced operational-level maritime command and control (C2) capabilities to all NATO command structure headquarters and centers to support peacetime, crisis responses and contingency operations.

The second part of your question centers on the Alliance Maritime Strategy supported by the NATO Maritime Security Operations concept, written in 2011 and focusing on the maintenance of a secure and safe maritime environment in the 21st century. Many capacities are not a reality yet within the NATO force structure; requirements range from protection of critical infrastructures to maritime counter-terrorism. ACT is participating in several initiatives such as the Multinational Experimentation 7 relating to the global commons and the NATO Undersea Research Centre programs in order to make them a reality. In a nutshell ACT works hard with civil-military actors to enhance cooperation and information-sharing in response to disruptive behaviors on the high seas.

Jerzy Deren, Col, Polish Armed Forces (Ret.), Poland: How do you cope with a vital NATO benchmark, the required capabilities roadmap, related to interoperability and standardization process of correlation and coordination with the force planning process?

General Abrial: It was in the realization of the increasingly integrated nature of all the different areas that you touch upon in your question that NATO reviewed its procedures and devised the new NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP) in 2009.

In this new capabilities based approach, NATO tries to identify the set of capabilities that she must have in order to meet its level of ambition. Each capability has interoperability and standardization aspects that nationally-provided solutions must fulfill.

The NDPP occurs within a structured and integrated four year process and focuses on medium-and longer-term capability development, while at the same time remaining responsive to unanticipated requirements arising from current operations.

Coordination is undertaken, both within and between the NATO structures and member nations' own processes.

The NDPP is still young and is still in its transition cycle, so it is too early to evaluate how well it is going. But in my opinion, the NDPP is a real step forward. It provides the nations with a robust planning mechanism that offers traceability and transparency.

Jordan Becker, Maj, Instructor, United States Military Academy (West Point), USA: What should NATO do to overcome cultural obstacles limiting member states’ pooling of resources in key strategic areas such as Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR), weapons procurement, and force projection platforms? Is a shared strategic culture among NATO members a realistic possibility? If so, why do you think so, and how can it be achieved? If not, can effective resource pooling take place in the absence of convergence in the realm of strategic culture?

General Abrial: Each nation is unique due to its history and culture, and this diversity enriches NATO. Being part of NATO helps us to understand each other, to know each other’s culture better, thus aiding us to operate not only side by side but in an integrated way. It is part of my job at ACT to transform the forces of the Alliance in order to make sure that these differences are put aside and that we build on common ground.

In our daily business we are working together to improve our Alliance. We in NATO organize many events in which NATO members share their strategic insights in a collaborative spirit. A good example was the collective work done to design the new Strategic Concept that shapes the Alliance’s future for the coming decade.

Regarding pooling and sharing (or what we call in NATO multinational collaboration), I think that effectiveness requires strategic proximity among the nations that are working on a common project. For example France and United-Kingdom, even if they are at the starting point of a substantial cooperation with the signing of the Lancaster Treaty last year, have long had similar strategic interests and goals.

Yes, I think that a shared strategic culture is a precondition for multinational collaboration, but the latter requires much more than that as I mentioned last week in the first part of the Atlantic-Community.org web chat.

Dr. William Eliason, Col, USAF (Ret.), Editor, Joint Force Quarterly, USA: With the stand down of US Joint Forces Command which ACT had a direct relationship with on many projects, how has ACT adjusted to this new situation in relation to transformation discussions with the US Department of Defense?

General Abrial: The relationship with US Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) was strong and fruitful. When JFCOM’s disestablishment was decided, General Odierno, the commander of JFCOM, and I wanted the relationship to be preserved. We put in place a series of measures to remain in direct contact with all the functions formerly in JFCOM’s portfolio. This new arrangement is even more promising than the previous one.

Additionallly, the disestablishment of JFCOM offered us the opportunity to engage more directly and broadly across the Joint Staff. In this perspective, ACT established a Pentagon Liaison position currently held by a British colonel. The relationship between my staff and the Joint Staff is now very strong at all levels, and growing.

In my mind it is a win-win situation: On one hand, ACT benefits from the significant knowledge and capabilities of the US Department of Defense and on the other hand, the Joint Staff benefits from the fact that we represent 28 nations. We bring this multinational approach to all aspects of our work and we can also offer a flavor of what the other 27 allies can expect from the Alliance and from each other.

Dr. Scott W. Ruston, Assistant Research Professor, Consortium for Strategic Communication, Arizona State University, US Navy Reservist: In a constrained budgetary environment and a geo-political landscape that increasingly sees non-state actors as agents of change to the security environment, do you see a role for strategic communication as a tool, alongside military actions, for NATO achieving its security goals? What capabilities are currently lacking in the realm of strategic communication and how does NATO ACT develop strategic communication capabilities?

General Abrial: Strategic communications contribute to general public awareness, understanding and support of NATO as part of a broader, on-going public diplomacy effort.

The final declaration of the Strasbourg/Kehl NATO Summit in 2009 stated that “it is increasingly important that the Alliance communicates in an appropriate, timely, accurate and responsive manner on its evolving roles, objectives and missions” and that “Strategic communications are an integral part of our efforts to achieve the Alliance’s political and military objectives.”

I strongly believe that Strategic communications must be incorporated into all operational planning, instead of being relegated to an after-the-fact attempt to explain, or build support for a decision that has already been taken.

Also, NATO Strategic Communications should be modern in technique and technology in order to match the new information cycle. They must be proactive; engaged with, and responsive to, public opinion at all levels. NATO must also be able to use them to anticipate and to counter any misinformation.

NATO issued a military concept in 2010. But there is always room for improvement, especially in building a professional framework for strategic communications related military disciplines – public affairs, information operations and psychological operations.

One of the lessons we learned from the NATO operation in Libya is that we must maintain these three disciplines coordinated at the right level. We now are dedicating more and more attention, through both staff resources and training.