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29.09.2006 | Yanukovych’s Government and NATO: Deepened Cooperation or Deepened Vagueness?
Oleksandr Sushko - Center for Peace, Conversion and Foreign Policy of Ukraine

Ukraine will not become a NATO member with the government of Yanukovych. It became clear to the majority of experts even prior to statements of the Ukrainian PM in Brussels on 14 September. After appearance of a blue-crimson-red coalition, only maintenance of existing cooperation format with NATO but not a rapid move forward could be expected. However, if the Euro-Atlantic integration could be considered not as a goal but as a tool for facilitating long-term national interests of Ukraine as well as an instrument for advantageous geopolitical position, it becomes obvious that the Regions Party won’t mind holding a ‘Euro-Atlantic card’ in its pocket in order to  use it when the moment comes.


 


Yanukovych’s government has another question to answer to and that is about the model of Ukraine that is going to be built and about the consequences of this building process. And it is not about the time-frame for Yanukovych to sign and send the official request for joining the MAP to Brussels but about a question of Ukraine becoming closer to political, economic, social and security standards common for the Euro-Atlantic space during his leadership. This will assist the next government in making a leap towards the formal NATO membership getting both public support inside Ukraine and approval from all NATO member states without any major problems.


 


The train Ukraine could take to the MAP by the end of this year is irretrievably gone. At the present stage, both in Ukraine and outside of it there is no common answer to the question whether Ukraine had real chances to get MAP on NATO Summit in Riga if the government clearly articulated such aspirations. Two polar positions have been announced by well-known Western analysts at the end of September: Vladimir Sokor in his publication for Jamestown Foundation is convinced that the political decision on offering Ukraine to join the MAP was adopted by NATO members in the beginning of summer, while Bruce Jackson in his interview for Day Newspaper (‘Den’) insists on the opposite, stating that the majority of NATO countries agreed on prematurity of offering MAP to Ukraine. Which one of these assessments is right is not clear yet and might not be clarified at all.


 


However, an issue of Ukraine joining the MAP definitely has not been officially discussed by NATO’s leadership. The decision on offering the MAP to Ukraine has not been made and couldn’t be made, as it would require the appeal from the Ukrainian government that has not been submitted. This fact obviously does not except a number of informal talks between the member states that definitely revealed difference between the group of those widely supporting Ukraine’s membership in NATO (USA, Poland, UK, Baltic states) and the group of skeptics (France, Germany, Belgium, Spain). The Skeptics are known to have had special conditions for their support in offering MAP to Ukraine. Among the conditions were: formation of legitimate and capable government that would clearly state and practically implement the Euro-Atlantic integration. For instance, we reckon the German government of Merkel inclined to support the Ukrainian MAP if the effective democratic (“orange”) coalition has been formed. It is known, that an absolutely positive signal received by Foreign Minister Tarasyuk on NATO-Ukraine Commission meeting in Sophia in April was due to real chances, as it then seemed, to form the government by the allies from the Orange Revolution of 2004.


 


Therefore, the government dominated with the Party of Regions that opposed Ukraine’s membership in NATO back in 2004 and still does so in 2006 could not get the MAP even if President Yushchenko managed to convince PM Yanukovych to sign formal application. Because with assistance of diplomatic services from the member states NATO is fully informed about positions of the Ukrainian political parties on such important issue as NATO membership. The rapid change of the RP’s position would probably fail to be understood and approved by the voters as well as by the European politicians. In the same time, discussions between the NATO members on the Ukrainian issue revealed a fundamentally important fact – an issue of Ukraine’s membership in NATO is not theoretic but it is a completely realistic paragraph on the Alliance’s agenda. It also means that the doors to NATO are really open for Ukraine and the domestic situation is a key indication of the integration intensity.


 


Obviously, Yanukovych’s statements in Brussels could be regarded as contradictory. However, a proper comprehensive assessment of the statements has not appeared in the Ukrainian and international media. The polar interpretations should be rejected straight away as Yanukovych has not reversed the foreign policy of Ukraine in 180º and the issue of refusal from the strategic Euro-Atlantic integration is not raised at the moment. However, due to the PM’s position, Ukraine lost its quickest way to NATO. Yet, it is not clear whether this quickest way would become the optimal or would it be full of obstacles that could be avoided with the slower way. Actually, one of well-known Western supporters of Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic integration noted soon after the Yanukovych’s talks in Brussels saying that choosing between fast process of Ukraine’s accession to NATO with the price of gravening internal conflicts and slow accession through consistent process of reaching national consensus, the latter should be a better option. The aim of national consensus should be ensured to not be turned into attempt of using the public opinion to cover a lack of the political will for the Euro-Atlantic integration and reluctance to implement the complex systematic reforms necessary for NATO membership. 


 


In this regard, the contradiction in position of the Head of the Ukrainian Government on separating issues of cooperation with NATO and Membership in NATO could not be ignored. Every kind of cooperation requires a clear understanding what are the goal and stages of such cooperation. If, particularly, the country aims to become a NATO member, the format of its cooperation with NATO will be different from the one that does not foresee membership as the goal.


 


On the way towards NATO membership the country is expected to go through certain stages defined by the NATO Summit in Washington in 1999. Particularly, NATO MAP is an imperative format of preparation for membership. The MAP is preceded by the Intensified Dialogue on Membership that is the short-term preparation for the MAP. Since April 2005 Ukraine is in the format of the Intensified Dialogue and it is done with the most of tasks at this integration stage. However, the MAP does not guarantee membership and does not even set any time for achieving possible membership in the Alliance. For example, Albania and Macedonia obtained the MAP in 1999 just when it was introduced and are still implementing it for 7 years. Still the accession date for these states has not been defined yet. Croatia joined the MAP in 2002. Meanwhile, those successful Central European and Baltic states that have been invited to join in 2002 managed to implement the MAP in three years.


 


The thesis of the Ukrainian Prime Minister on impossibility of joining the MAP having low public support of Ukraine’s membership in NATO fails against any criticism. Because the MAP itself includes political instruments aimed at changing negative trends of public opinion. This is evidenced by analysis of the MAP’s contents that was carried on during 1999-2002 by Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria and other countries that found too low public support of NATO membership. For instance public support of NATO membership in Slovenia and Slovakia in 1999 has not exceeded over 35%. In order to overcome the existing problems, Slovak and Slovenian governments applied MAP for the informational campaign. Significance of this work is proved by annual reports submitted during the MAP process. Each report consisted of a separate part featuring on the information campaign that was among the priority tasks. For example, NATO information campaign in Slovakia involved efforts of numerous media and NGOs using significant allotments from the state budget and managed to properly inform about advantages of NATO membership and to convince society in the undoubted appropriateness of accession to the Alliance. When the invitation for membership was received in 2002, it was over 60% of society that supported NATO membership.


 


PM’s position causes hesitations about his awareness of the Euro-Atlantic integration, its stages and logics. In particular, if one of basic thesis from Yanukovych’s speech on NUC regarded a need to “intensify cooperation” with NATO, then according to the current stage of the cooperation it is only the MAP that could be considered as the “intensification” because Ukraine already approaches the final stages foreseen by the Action Plan signed in 2002. Moreover, Ukraine used the most of cooperation opportunities available with the Intensified Dialogue on Membership.


 


Today, due to the government’s position, Ukraine remains in transitional format of the Intensified Dialogue on Membership. This format does not exclude Ukraine’s preparation for membership from NATO’s agenda but still, it does not set political obligations that must be daily fulfilled in order to bring Ukraine closer to NATO standards by reforming political, economic and social sectors. The society by this has not obtained effective instrument of control over the authorities and its eagerness to carry out systematic transformations towards consolidating democratic institutions, rule of law, competitiveness of market economy and open society.


 


In this regard, the reaction of the ‘third sector’ sharply criticizing ungrounded position of the government’s leadership is not surprising. On 17 July a number of NGOs and think tanks addressed an appeal to the Government, President and NSDC to examine the situation with the MAP and to adopt a legitimate decision on this issue. On the next day the Network of Pro-European NGOs announced its Statement refuting argumentation brought up by the PM in order to refuse from joining the MAP. The Statement also consists of proposals to tackle the situation as well as ways of work with the public opinion.


 


Deceleration of Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic integration caused by the internal political situation is a sad fact for NATO supporters in Ukraine and Ukraine’s supporters in NATO. However it should be reasonably regarded both in Ukraine and NATO. The volume of ‘home task’ for Ukraine anyway deprives Ukraine from rapid accession to NATO in 2 or 3 years. If the national consensus on NATO membership failed to be reached, the integration process will definitely require more time and more convincing grounds comparing to those countries where NATO membership has not been doubted from the very beginning.


 


The main problem is not about Ukraine slowing down on its way towards NATO although the NATO fans in Ukraine are rather disappointed now. The main problem here is that NATO accession issue alongside the lack of coordination between authorities point to the fact of serious problems in the political decision-making and implementation processes in Ukraine. The state’s ability to implement clear and coherent foreign policy is one of fundamental criteria that assess the country’s readiness to become a NATO member. So, it is not Yanukovych’s statements in Brussels that caused the problems but those diseases of Ukrainian state administration the statements indicated on. The current situation discredits Ukraine and harms its reputation, so this problem must be solved urgently. The mechanisms of avoiding such situations in future must be introduced. 


 


Doors to NATO membership are open for Ukraine. This is a very essential fact, especially with regard to the difficulties of recognizing Ukraine’s perspective of membership in the European Union. Key to NATO membership is in Ukraine’s hands and the speed of accession depends on three main facts: the first is a level of Ukraine’s correspondence to the standards of NATO membership, the second is the political will of the Ukrainian leadership and the third is effective mobilization of public opinion on NATO membership.


Among the tasks for main power centers in Ukraine the top one is to overcome the existing lack of understanding Ukraine’s position on the MAP, elaboration of common consolidated state position and bringing it over to NATO leadership, governments of NATO member states as soon as possible, at least before the NATO Summit in Riga.



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