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At last week’s Sino-American summit, Donald Trump treated Xi Jinping as an equal—and, in doing so, granted the Chinese leader exactly what he wanted. Trump personally greeted Xi at Joint Base Andrews, marking the first time a US president has met a foreign leader there since 1962. The gesture was part of a pomp-filled state visit, complete with a red carpet, a military flyover, and a state dinner. Trump greeted Xi at the military airfield —a courtesy that Xi did not extend in Beijing, where Vice President Han Zheng met Trump on the tarmac.
For Xi, the benefits of such treatment are clear: His message to US allies is that they are irrelevant as Beijing and Washington manage world affairs as coequal powers. But why did Trump choose this path?
Here are five reasons the red carpet was the wrong call.
1. Xi’s ambition to overtake the US is not a secret. He has said as much, including to Vladimir Putin. Xi told Putin that the world is experiencing “changes unseen in a hundred years” and that the two of them are driving those changes together—language he has used repeatedly.
2. Beijing has propped up Iran through the recent conflict. China’s support includes oil purchases, diplomatic cover, sanctions-evasion assistance, and dual-use transfers tied to Iran’s missile program. China purchases roughly 90 percent of Iran’s oil exports, sustaining Tehran’s finances. US officials have tracked Iranian ships departing Chinese ports and identified a reported Chinese deal to supply Iran with shoulder-fired air-defense systems.
3. China keeps Russia’s war machine running. Trump may not be sentimental about Ukraine, but he has repeatedly said he wants the war over. That’s harder while Chinese state-owned oil companies account for roughly half of China’s Russian oil purchases, revenue Moscow depends on to fund the war.
4. Xi has ratcheted up pressure on Taiwan. China’s comprehensive coercion campaign includes an increase in military aircraft sorties near Taiwan, from 380 in 2020 to 5,709 last year. Trump may have no attachment to Taipei, but he has no appetite for a Pacific war resulting in China’s control over Taiwan’s advanced technology.
5. China’s economic damage to the US is well-documented. Trump was elected in 2016 in part as the candidate willing to say China was hollowing out American industry, and intellectual-property theft has remained a constant complaint since. The newest front is massive theft of intellectual property in the AI industry. US cybersecurity agencies say Chinese AI companies are running industrial-scale knowledge-distillation campaigns.
Fortunately, some members of Congress still see China clearly: Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Roger Wicker stated that he would have counseled against inviting Xi for “such a lavish welcome.” The House Select Committee on China released a video that labeled Xi as “the No. 1 adversary of the American people and our national security,” while Representative John Moolenaar urged Trump to confront Xi on China’s support for Russia and Iran.
But Trump has reversed course from his first term’s more competitive approach to China. He is drawn to strength and fears that China is more powerful than the US. A trade truce is theoretically defensible given China’s near-total control of rare-earth processing, the leverage behind Beijing’s willingness to suspend export controls until January 10, 2027—newly negotiated from the original November 10 deadline—in exchange for US tariff concessions. But it is only reasonable if Washington uses the time to strengthen its own commercial position—and so far, rebuilding a US rare-earths supply chain remains costly and slow, leaving the country still exposed to Beijing’s leverage.
Washington would do well to remember that it too has leverage. The Chinese economy is struggling. Deflation had persisted for 10 straight quarters, finally lifting only due to rising global energy costs; property investment has collapsed by nearly 44 percent; and youth unemployment has hit nearly 17 percent. On its current trajectory, China is not catching the US—it’s leaning more heavily on trade surpluses, having posted a record trade surplus exceeding $1 trillion in 2025. Beijing’s dependence on foreign markets absorbing its surplus is a source of American leverage if Trump coordinates market closures and supply-chain cutoffs with Beijing’s other big markets.
At the moment, there are no signs the US will take that approach. Instead, Trump and Xi are already scheduled to meet twice more this year—at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in November and the G20 summit in December—and there are indications that the US is “hollowing out” the G20 agenda to turn the summit into a backdrop for another Trump–Xi meeting. For Xi’s part, he is happy to continue strutting down the red carpet so long as Trump is happy to continue rolling it out for him.
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