The second year of Ukraine’s war for survival began with high hopes of victory and liberation. It is ending in a long, bloody slog for marginal gains. There’s more of this ahead: Ukraine cannot win a decisive victory in 2024. But Kyiv and its Western supporters can — and must — find creative ways of intensifying the pressure on Russia while building strength for 2025.

Ukraine probably won’t be able to retake much territory this year, because its military is exhausted from protracted, brutal fighting — and because its principal backer, the US, has been so dilatory in replenishing its vital aid. The immediate task will be defending the country from Russian assaults, on the front lines and from the skies, while perhaps keeping Russian President Vladimir Putin’s forces off balance through occasional counterattacks. But hanging on won’t be enough to defeat a larger, stronger opponent.

Ukraine and its allies must also shape the war, this year and beyond, by pursuing a five-pronged strategy.

First, controlling the Black Sea. The naval war has been a bright spot for Ukraine — surprisingly, given that it doesn’t have much of a navy. Nonetheless, Kyiv has used sea drones and missiles to notch spectacular kills of enemy warships, bloody the headquarters of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet in Crimea, and drive the bulk of that fleet back to the safer, more distant confines of Novorossiysk. That achievement, in turn, has weakened Russia’s ability to interdict Ukraine’s trade by blockading its coast. So Ukraine will keep taking the fight to Russia in the Black Sea, and it will need more long-range missiles to hold Putin’s navy at risk.

Second, squeezing Crimea. That peninsula is a logistical hub for Russian operations in Ukraine; it is a symbol of Russian resurrection under Putin. Attacks on Crimea thus complicate Russia’s ability to defend or attack; some experts also believe that Putin will complicate Russia’s ability to defend or attack; some experts also believe that Putin will make peace only when he fears his control of the peninsula is at risk. So Ukraine will try to maintain a drumbeat of attacks on the infrastructure, such as the Kerch Bridge, that connects Crimea to Russia — as well as strikes, on airfields, supply depots, and other targets, meant to deny Moscow the military benefits of occupation.

Third, and more controversially, striking Russia itself. Ukraine has carried out drone attacks on Russian bomber bases and even, it appears, the Kremlin. It has sponsored proxy attacks into Russian territory and sabotaged railroads used to bring materiel to the front. More recently, it responded to Russian drone and missile attacks on Ukrainian cities with reciprocal strikes on the Russian city of Belgorod.

Ukraine should stay away from concerted attacks on Russian population centers, lest it muddy the moral clarity of its struggle. But it has every reason to intensify attacks — using drones, special forces and other long-reach capabilities — on military targets and symbols of regime power within Russia. Doing so can help maintain morale at home when Ukraine is under ferocious Russian bombardment. It also complicates Putin’s effort to pretend that his war has few domestic costs. In the past, Washington has publicly opposed Ukrainian attacks on Russia proper. But that opposition is fading within the Biden administration, at least in private, as Putin’s ugly assault grinds on.

Fourth, seizing sovereign assets. Within the US government, support has grown for appropriating the Russian foreign exchange funds frozen at the start of the war, and giving them to Ukraine to support its defense and reconstruction. Some governments in Europe, where most of the frozen assets are located, remain skeptical. There is also residual concern, in Washington, about whether seizing assets might compromise America’s reputation as an economic safe haven and deprive the West of a bargaining chip in eventual peace negotiations.

Yet these concerns are becoming less compelling, given the imperative to raise the price Russia ultimately pays for its aggression — and Ukraine’s desperate need for potentially hundreds of billions of dollars in economic support.

These four steps are crucial to maintaining momentum in a difficult year. But none of them will solve Ukraine’s main problem — the challenge of liberating its territory Russia still controls.

The fifth prong, then, involves sustaining Ukraine’s defenses in 2024 while building for a major offensive in 2025. This means new injections of artillery, air defenses, armor and airpower. It requires providing more long-range strike assets — such as US ATACMS and German Taurus missiles — that can help strike Russian targets throughout Ukraine. It also means helping Ukraine train its forces more thoroughly — some were sent into combat last year with just a few weeks of preparation — and to raise its ability to conduct complex offensive operations at scale.

Even with this support, Ukraine probably can’t retake all the territory it has lost since 2014 — or even since February 2022. But such aid will be the minimum requirement of a program to reclaim some lost territory, show that time is not on Russia’s side, and strengthen Ukraine’s hand for an eventual negotiation.

This is a strategy of diminished expectations from the hopes of 2022, no doubt. Even so, it demands greater risk-tolerance, especially around issues like providing long-range missiles, than the West has shown to date.

Above all, this strategy hinges on whether America remains committed to the fight. Ukrainian bravery is impressive, but US aid is indispensable. With it, Ukraine can still achieve an acceptable outcome. Without it, Ukraine will lose this war — with all the ugly consequences that are sure to follow.